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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the governance of forced migration in Southeast Asia. The region hosts about 
2.5 million of forcibly displaced migrants from a worldwide total of 70 million (2018). The migrants 
include intra- ASEAN and non-ASEAN refugees or asylum seekers, notably from the Middle East.  
Based on a review of recent literature, the paper investigates three main destination states in SEA 
that host the majority of the forced migrants; Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. The paper exam-
ines (i) local policies in the governance of forced migrants and (2) the practice of non-refoulement 
principle. The findings reveal that in terms of forced migration governance, Indonesia, Malaysia, and 
Thailand are ‘same but different'; meaning that despite being similar, each country produces differ-
ent outcomes.   
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INTRODUCTION 
Forced migration is not new to 
Southeast Asia. Its beginnings can be 
traced back to the colonial period.  In her 
study on the most prominent commercial 
enterprise of the early colonial era, name-
ly the Dutch East India Company 
(Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie/
VOC), Ward (2008) argues that forced mi-
gration in the form of forced-labors and 
slaves had existed through the "imperial 
networks" since the 16th century. During 
that time, convicts and exiles were ban-
ished from Indonesia (Batavia) to South 
Africa (Cape of Good Hope).   
Unlike the colonial period, present 
day forced migration occurs due to differ-
ent reasons but mainly because of 
(armed) conflict, warfare, persecution, 
and violence. In post-colonial Southeast 
Asia, we have witnessed different waves 
of forced migration triggered by events 
such as the Indochina wars and the Anda-
man Sea crisis of the 1970s and, more re-
cently, the violence in Myanmar. Despite 
the differences, both colonial and post-
colonial times demonstrate that the na-
ture of migration was largely involuntary. 
This aspect is in accordance with the defi-
nition of forced migration set by the Inter-
national Organization for Migration/IOM 
(2019, p. 75)  as “a migratory movement 
which, although the drivers can be di-
verse, involves force, compulsion, or coer-
cion.” The UNHCR (2019c) further classi-
fied forced migrants as refugees, refugee-
like situations, asylum-seekers, internally 
displaced persons (IDPs), stateless peo-
ple, and others of concern. 
The UNHCR report (2019c) shows 
that in 2018, 70.8 million people were 
forcibly displaced around the world. This 
fact means that for every single minute in 
a year, 25 individuals are forcibly dis-
placed. In 2009, the number of displaced 
people was almost half of 2018, amount-
ing to 43.3 million. Southeast Asia alone 
was predicted to host 3.2 million dis-
placed people in 2020 (UNHCR, 2019b).  
This number excludes the millions of un-
documented populations, some of whom 
fall under the category of forced-migrants.  
Research on forced migration in 
Southeast Asia appears to be a relatively 
new field, beginning in the 1980s.  The 
subject however received a growing inter-
est thereafter (Stange, Sakdapolrak, Sas-
iwongsaroj, & Kourek, 2019).  In studying 
217 peer-reviewed English articles in the 
database Web of Science from January 
2013 to September 2018, Stange et al 
found that the publications had increased 
from 20 to 67 in 2013 and 2017, respec-
tively.  
We observe that most research on 
forced migration in Southeast Asia can be 
classified into three broad categories with 
each representing a specific approach. 
The first is the regional approach, which 
examines the role of regional governance 
agency, namely the Association of South-
east Asian Nations (ASEAN) in relation to 
forced migration. Under this category,  
scholars studied different perspectives of 
ASEAN’s handling of forced migration  
such as the collective perspective and hu-
man rights regime (Petcharamesree, 
2016), regional integration efforts being 
exclusive (Wahab, 2017), cooperation 
with Australia (Nethery, 2014), compari-
son with the European Union (Cook, 
2010), regional concept of refugees pro-
tection (Kneebone, 2014), response to re-
gional affairs like the Indochina crisis 
(Ahmad, 1979; Indorf & Suhrke, 1981; 
Richardson, 1982) and the forcibly dis-
placed Rohingyas (Jati, 2017; Shivakoti, 
2017; Trihartono, 2018).  
The second category of research on 
forced migration is examined from the 
national approach, where researchers 
draw case studies of forced migration at 
the national level of Southeast Asian 
countries. These works are mainly fo-
cused on individual countries that host 
forced migrants in Southeast Asia such as 
Indonesia (Hugo, 2002, 2006; Missbach, 
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2015, 2017a; Missbach, Adiputera, & Pra-
bandari, 2018; Sampson, Gifford, & Tay-
lor, 2016), Malaysia (Kaur, 2013; Muni-
andy, 2018; Nah, 2010), Myanmar (Ahsan 
Ullah, 2016; Lee & Ware, 2016; South & 
Jolliffe, 2015) and Thailand (H. J. Lang, 
2002; Tecle et al., 2018; Zeus, 2011).  
The last category is the comparative 
approach, where the study on forced mi-
gration involves two or more Southeast 
Asian countries. The examples are on In-
donesia and Malaysia (Prabandari & Adi-
putera, 2019), Thailand, and Malaysia 
(Hedman, 2008; Lego, 2018) and Thailand 
and Myanmar (Grundy-Warr & Yin, 
2002). These studies mostly viewed 
forced migration from the perspective of 
border protection and the proximity of 
these countries as neighbors. We find the 
last category, the least studied, compared 
to the regional and national categories.    
Noting the lack of multi country 
comparisons, the present study aims to 
examine the governance of forced  migra-
tion comparatively in three Southeast 
Asian countries, namely Indonesia, Malay-
sia, and Thailand. These countries were 
chosen for two reasons. Firstly, Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Thailand, to some extent, 
share similar characteristics, which will 
be discussed shortly. Secondly, although 
Malaysia and Thailand are well discussed 
case studies on forced migration in the 
region (Stange et al., 2019), most of the 
works investigated both countries sepa-
rately, thus limiting a comprehensive de-
piction of the similarities as well as differ-
ences between the two countries.   
Indeed, Indonesia, Malaysia, and 
Thailand have become major destinations 
for refugees in Southeast Asia. Since the 
1970s, millions of forcibly displaced peo-
ple fled their countries and made either 
Indonesia, Malaysia, or Thailand as transit 
points. People from foreign countries 
could travel to Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, or 
Bangkok at "short notice and with rela-
tively easy visa requirements" (Jones, 
2019). Some of them have stayed long, 
spanning a few generations. Based on 
2019 data, the three countries collectively 
were the largest host for forced migrants 
in Southeast Asia (European Commission, 
2019) These three countries combined 
accommodate almost a million forced mi-
grants in the region, as shown in figure 1. 
Additionally, these countries are not 
state parties to the 1951 Convention and 
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its Protocol Relating to the Status of Refu-
gees. As a result, all three nations gave the 
mandate to the UNHCR to deal with 
forced migrants. The mandate includes 
"reception, registration, documentation 
and refugee status determination of asy-
lum-seekers and refugees" (UNHCR Ma-
laysia, n.d.). Among ASEAN members, only 
Cambodia and the Philippines have rati-
fied these legal documents. At the region-
al (ASEAN) level, there have been some 
key documents, such as the ASEAN Char-
ter and the ASEAN Human Rights Declara-
tion adopted as resolution and mitigation 
channels. These frameworks, however, do 
not explicitly mention forced migrants, 
refugees, or asylum-seekers (Wahab, 
2017). Instead, the term that is used, ra-
ther loosely, is migrant workers. 
In this paper, we combine both the 
national and regional approach by looking 
at how Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand 
deal with forced migrants, specifically 
what are their governance mechanisms. 
What, if any, are the similarities and dif-
ferences in their approaches? Finally, 
what role do regional mechanisms have in 
mitigating issues related to force mi-
grants, or do the countries operate  in silo, 
bilaterally, multilaterally, in association 
with ASEAN. In doing this, we hope to 
conflate the national and regional scales 
of governance and imply that a multilat-
eral approach may be effective in govern-
ing forced migration. 
In examining the governance of 
forced migration in Indonesia, Malaysia, 
and Thailand, we have considered two 
main criterias. These are, the local/
national policies towards forcibly dis-
placed people, and, the practice of non-
refoulement principle. The non-
refoulement principle is a part of the In-
ternational Customary Law (ICL) and In-
ternational Human Rights Law (IHRL). 
Both laws prohibit countries from expel-
ling the forcibly displaced people and de-
mand a guarantee on the part of the coun-
tries that no one is “subjected to torture 
or other cruel, inhuman and degrading 
treatment or punishment, or would be in 
danger of being subjected to enforced dis-
appearance, or of suffering another irrep-
arable harm.” (IOM, 2019, p. 147). The 
essential element is receiving countries 
should avoid repatriation of forced mi-
grants arriving their shores should there 
be strong indications that these migrants’ 
lives are in danger in their home country. 
Generally, ASEAN countries have 
shown compliance with the non- re-
foulement principle, for example, the case 
of the Vietnamese Boat People. There 
have been exceptions however, the most 
recent cases in the time of COVID 19 pan-
demic showed that Rohingya refugees ar-
riving on boats to the shores of Malaysia 
were sent back, while Acheh (Indonesia) 
provided them refuge. In order to under-
stand the practice of this international 
policy and the deviations, we need to first 
outline some major developments related 
to forced migrants in each of the country 
studied here.  The following section will 
look at the individual (local/national) sce-
nario, this will be followed with a discus-
sion of the comparisons and commonali-
ties that might inform a regional ap-
proach. 
RESEARCH METHODS 
The study is largely qualitative 
where a close analysis of existing litera-
ture and primary data on the respective 
countries are scrutinized.  The data is 
drawn from relevant empirical findings in 
multidisciplinary fields, ranging from in-
ternational relations, refugee and migra-
tion studies, regional governance, and 
public policy studies as well as supple-
mentary relevant and reliable sources 
from the internet. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Indonesian Context 
As of 2018, 14,016 persons were 
registered with the UNHCR Indonesia. 
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They came from 49 countries, with half of 
them originating from Afghanistan 
(UNHCR Indonesia, 2020). This number is 
comparatively smaller than other neigh-
boring countries like Malaysia and Thai-
land, as shown in the figure above. How-
ever, despite its low number, Indonesia is 
a popular transit country due to its prox-
imity to Australia, a third country destina-
tion. 
In terms of policies related to forced 
migration, there have been established 
national legal frameworks.  The first legal 
document related to forced migration is-
sued by the Indonesian government was 
in 1956, entitled "Circular Letter of the 
Prime Minister No. 11/R.I./1956 of 1956 
on Political Refugees". The Letter under-
lined the protection of political refugees 
and explicitly guaranteed their shelter. 
Article 1 of the Letter states that "political 
refugees who entered into or are in the 
Indonesian territory will be granted pro-
tection on the basis of human rights and 
fundamental freedom in accordance with 
international customary law." (Prime 
Minister of the Republic of Indonesia, 
1956).  This rule, however, was only en-
forced for three years. Thereafter, the In-
donesian government, in general, did not 
have a concise legal framework related to 
the governance of forced migration, par-
ticularly on refugees and asylum-seekers. 
It was only in the recent few years 
that Indonesia started to develop a robust 
legal platform dealing with this issue 
(Prabandari & Adiputera, 2019). In 2016, 
there were two crucial policies released 
by the Indonesian authorities. The first 
regulation was No IMI-0352.GR.02.07 on 
“Handling of Illegal Immigrants who De-
clared as Asylum Seekers or Refu-
gees” (Immigration Directorate General, 
2016). It was issued on 19 April 2016 by 
the Immigration Directorate General of 
Indonesia. The document regulates the 
treatment of refugees and asylum-
seekers, such as putting them in detention 
centers or other places and allowing them 
to stay in the country with the obligation 
to obey the law. Another policy was the 
Presidential Decree (Perpres) No 125 of 
2016 on the “Handling [of] Refugees and 
Asylum Seekers in Indonesia” (The Presi-
dent of the Republic of Indonesia, 2016). 
The document was signed by Indonesian 
President Joko Widodo on 31 December 
2016. The Perpres, in particular, has been 
applauded as “the first of its kind in Indo-
nesia” (Gordyn, 2017), a “significant de-
velopment” (Prabandari & Adiputera, 
2019), on the right track  (Tobing, 2019), 
a promising step for Indonesia (Varagur, 
2017) and an exemplary precedent for 
other countries (Gayatri & Bayani, 2017). 
The Perpres was also appreciated by the 
international community, considering it 
as a rare commitment (Tobing, 2019). It is 
because the Perpres is regarded to follow 
the Refugees Convention, either partially 
or its general principle. 
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that 
the Perpres policy has several weakness-
es. Missbach, Adiputera, Prabandari, et al. 
(2018) listed them as lacking three as-
pects, namely detention alternatives, po-
litical will, and funding. Additionally, gov-
ernance of forced migration is not among 
the top priorities of the Indonesian gov-
ernment as almost 10 percent of the pop-
ulation still live below the poverty line 
(The World Bank, 2019). Thus, it is fair to 
say that the Perpres is a short-term re-
sponse, rather than a long-term solution 
to the crisis.  
In short, the Indonesian policy could 
be said as to “assimilate but not settle” 
procedure, thus, putting the refugees in 
an “awkward limbo”. (Bemma, 2018). One 
clear example is the case of Kalideres 
camp, one of the detention centers situat-
ed in Daan Mogot, West Jakarta. Following 
the Perpres, the Governor of Jakarta allo-
cated a portion of the fund to support 
about 1,500 forced migrants in the Ka-
lideres camp. In August 2019, the local 
government of Jakarta stopped the assis-
tance and asked them to leave the shelter 
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(Tambun & Yasmin, 2019).  The Jakarta 
Governor, Anies Baswedan claimed that it 
was not his responsibility to govern the 
forced migrants. The support given by his 
local government was temporary and lim-
ited, as he put pressure on the UNHCR as 
the  responsible institution in relation to 
forced migrants in the country. Anies stat-
ed that the “governance of refugees is at 
the hand of the UNHCR; therefore, the 
mandate is there. The nature of support in 
Jakarta is humanitarian to meet the basic 
needs when UNHCR was not able to do it. 
Now we returned the mandate. That is 
what we are doing now.” (Ikhsanudin, 
2019).  
In addition to the withdrawal of sup-
port from the local government, the 
forced migrants in the Kalideres camp al-
so faced rejection from the surrounding 
neighborhoods, who are mostly middle-
upper class households. At least ten ban-
ners hung across different streets in the 
area, with the message that “we, the resi-
dents of Daan Mogot, reject the immi-
grants center in our housing complex". 
The reasons for this unwelcoming con-
duct were a result of the host not being 
informed by the government and the fear 
of disturbances from the immigrants 
(Satria, 2019). 
Contrary to the Kalideres situation, 
refugees were warmly welcomed by the 
community in other regions like Aceh, Su-
matra. The region has welcomed a series 
of boats full of forced migrants stranded 
in the sea. The famous instance was in 
2015 when 1,800 refugees were turned 
away by the Malaysian and Thailand gov-
ernments and eventually arrived in Aceh 
(Varagur, 2018). Although the Indonesian 
authorities forbade people to help strand-
ed refugees, the Acehnese acted other-
wise. The Acehnese spontaneously res-
cued those forced migrants and provided 
them with the initial support, before the 
government and non-state actors inter-
vened (Missbach, 2016). However, Miss-
bach considers this kind of hospitality as 
facets (2017b) and hostile (2016) because 
it did not provide long-term and sustaina-
bility strategies. From these experiences, 
many issues needed to be addressed by 
the Indonesian government. 
In relation to the non-refoulement 
practice, Indonesia broadly respects its 
principle as the 2016 Perpres emphasizes 
the country’s commitment to internation-
al laws (Tobing, 2017). Prior to that, there 
were minor cases on the Andaman Sea 
crisis where the Indonesian (along with 
the Malaysian) authorities followed the 
“cold policy” where they were silent and 
refused to rescue thousands of people on 
boats (Dhumieres, 2015). When the Indo-
nesian citizens (the Acehnese) instantane-
ously saved some of those people, the 
government then started to shift its poli-
cy, as stated earlier. It is fair to say that 
the Indonesian government in all earnest 
has tried to honor the non  refoulement 
policy. In the next section, we turn our 
attention to Malaysia and Thailand. 
Malaysian Context 
In 2019, Malaysia had a total of 
252,742 forced-migrants (UNHCR, 
2019c). They comprised mainly 177,000 
asylum-seekers and refugees who were 
registered by the UNHCR and 10,000 
stateless people.  The majority of them 
were from different ethnicities found in 
Myanmar (e.g., Rohingya, Chin, Rakhine, 
and Arakanese) and also from countries 
such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine, Paki-
stan, Sri Lanka, Syria, and Yemen (UNHCR 
Malaysia, 2020a). These registered refu-
gees and asylum-seekers were found 
spread across the  states of Malaysia, as 
shown in Table 1. 
In addition to the numbers above, it 
is believed that between two to four mil-
lion undocumented migrants were in the 
country, as of 2019 (UNHCR, 2019a). Giv-
en this substantial number of both regis-
tered and unregistered displaced people 
in Malaysia, it is pertinent to evaluate the 
governance mechanism towards forced 
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migrants in Malaysia.  
In terms of the legal framework, 
"there are no legislative or administrative 
provisions in place for dealing with the 
situation of refugees and asylum-seekers 
in Malaysia” (UNHCR Malaysia, 2020b). 
Probably the only available document is 
the Malaysian Immigration Act 1959/63 
(The Commissioner of Law Revision Ma-
laysia, 1959). The Act recognizes only 
documented or legal migrants. Thus, it 
implies that forced migrants are catego-
rized as undocumented or illegal (unless 
they are registered with the UNHCR).  
There has not been much progress in 
legally recognizing forced migrants, with 
the government continuing to rely and 
adopt UNHCR’s documenting process and 
recognition. In fact forced migrants have 
been used as political rhetoric for the 
competing Malaysian political parties to 
mobilize the loyalists and attract uncom-
mitted voters (Jerit, 2004).  
 Prominent example include Malay-
sia’s 14th general election in 2018. On 22 
September 2015, a new political coalition 
was formed, named as the Alliance of 
Hope (Pakatan Harapan). The Alliance 
consisted of four parties namely the Dem-
ocratic Action Party (DAP), Malaysian 
United Indigenous Party (BERSATU), Na-
tional Trust Party (Amanah) and People's 
Justice Party (PKR), that collectively con-
tested in the election to challenge the Na-
tional Front (BN) coalition that has been 
ruling Malaysia since the country’s inde-
pendence (Teoh, 2015). On 8 March 2018, 
the Alliance of Hope issued a political 
manifesto, entitled Book of Hope: Re-
building Our Nation Fulfilling Our Hopes. 
The manifesto contained 10 promises to 
be fulfilled in the first 100 days of their 
administration and 60 promises in five 
years respectively if they win the election 
(Pakatan Harapan Manifesto, 2018).  
The issue of forced migration was 
also included in the manifesto, mentioned 
in Promise 35 and 59. The promises were 
"raising the dignity of workers and creat-
ing more quality jobs" and "to lead efforts 
to resolve the Rohingya and Palestine cri-
ses," respectively. For Promise 35, the Al-
liance of Hope government claimed to le-
gitimize the status of Rohingyas and Syri-
an refugees by "providing them with UN-
HCR cards and ensuring their legal right 
to work……Providing them with jobs will 
help refugees to build new lives and with-
out subjecting them to oppres-
sion.” (Pakatan Harapan Manifesto, 2018, 
p. 78). In Promise 59, the agenda was to 
resolve the Rohingya issue by "addressing 
the efforts of regional countries" and 
"make serious attempts" to find a long-
term solution for the Palestine crisis, as 
well as to ratify the 1951 International 
Convention on Refugees (Pakatan Hara-
pan Manifesto, 2018, p. 121). 
The Alliance of Hope coalition finally 
achieved victory in the general election, 
held on 9 May 2018. However, a year after 
the victory, the ruling government, named 
as Malaysia Baharu (New Malaysia), was  
criticized for their underperformance as 
the promises made in the Manifesto were 
mostly unfulfilled (Heijmans & Shukry, 
2019; Shuzaidah, 2019; Thomas, 2019). 
This included Promise 35 and 59.  
The chairman of the Alliance of 
Hope, Mahathir Mohamad, who also be-
came the Malaysian Prime Minister, re-
sponded to the critics by asking for extra 
time to deliver all the promises. Later, 
Mahathir admitted that it was hard to im-
plement the manifesto and even stated 
the fact that the Alliance of Hope had be-
come the victim of their own manifesto. 
He stated that “we thought that we were 
going to lose [the election]. We put in 
tough things in the manifesto so that if we 
lose, the old government (BN) would be 
trapped. But now, we are the government. 
We are victims of our own manifes-
to.” (Hafiz, 2019; M Fakhrull Halim, Lee, & 
Rashid, 2019). 
In February 2020, the Alliance of 
Hope coalition collapsed, with members 
from two of the coalition parties defecting 
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to form a new alliance with two other par-
ties that were defeated in the 14th gen-
eral election, namely the United Malay 
National Organization (UMNO) and the 
Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS). Under 
the new ruling government, known as 
Perikatan Nasional (The National Alli-
ance), fate of the marginalized groups re-
main uncertain and their condition con-
tinued to worsen in the Covid-19 pan-
demic era.  On April 16, 2020, the Royal 
Malaysian Navy intercepted a boat load 
carrying approximately 200 refugees off 
the coast of Malaysia. The boat was de-
nied entry into Malaysian waters but 
those on board were given food aid 
(Human Rights Watch, 2020).  Justifica-
tion of this action was due to fear of these 
refugees bringing in Covid-19 into the 
country.  
Member of the ruling government, 
Abdul Hadi Awang, also the leader of the 
Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) de-
fended the move by issuing a statement 
that read “The … decision by the security 
forces to bring aid while at the same time 
blocking the ship carrying the refugee 
from entering the country, while the 
world is battling with COVID-19, was a 
must.” (Benar News, 2020). A wave of 
hate speech against the Rohingya sur-
faced online in April 2020 after a number 
of statements issued by several individu-
als from the Myanmar Ethnic Rohingya 
Human Rights Organisation in Malaysia 
demanded several things from the Malay-
sian government, such as equal rights, job 
opportunities, health access and educa-
tion. This prompted the Home Minister, 
Hamzah Zainuddin to clear the air by say-
ing “Any organisation that claims to rep-
resent the Rohingya ethnic group is illegal 
under the RoS Act, and legal action can be 
taken. Therefore, Rohingya nationals who 
are holders of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) card 
have no status, rights or basis to make 
any claims on the government.” (Nik Anis, 
2020). 
The Alliance of Hope is not the only 
political front that exploited the forced 
migrants’ issue, particularly the Rohingya. 
Both the United Malay National Organiza-
tion (UMNO) and the Pan-Malaysian Is-
lamic Party (PAS) have had their share of 
strategically using the issue for political 
mileage. Both parties have been long-
term rivals in Malaysian politics. Follow-
ing their defeat in the 14th  General Elec-
tion, they agreed to consolidate their po-
litical relationship through the National 
Consensus Charter, signed on 14 Septem-
ber 2019 (Razak & Dzulkifly, 2019; Yunus, 
2019).  The ultimate aim is to win the 
next i.e.  15th General Election.  It is worth 
noting that this “frenemy mar-
riage” (Ueda, 2019) did not occur instant-
ly but as a result of long-term political in-
teraction. Despite their differences, both 
parties shared what they called ‘Islamic 
solidarity’. 
In many instances, the former rival 
parties were united to fight the cause of 
the Rohingya and Palestine. For instance, 
on 4 December 2016, they managed to 
gather around 10,000 people to protest 
the “ethnic cleansing” by the Myanmar 
Government, which further caused the 
influx of Rohingya forced migrants into 
Malaysia (Teoh, 2016).   In February 
2017, both parties launched the humani-
tarian program named Food Flotilla for 
Myanmar (Ruzki, Idris, & Adnan, 2017).  
All of these actions demonstrate how po-
litical parties employ rhetorical tactics to 
advance their interests. We agree with 
Hussin (2017) who claims that “the coun-
ter-narrative of Najib [UMNO] and Hadi 
[PAS], oddly enough, does not concern the 
fate of the Rohingya Muslims, who have 
been displaced over several generations 
in Myanmar, but instead has more to do 
with drumming up support for UMNO and 
PAS.” The issue has political clout for par-
ties and individuals hoping to retain pow-
er and the survival of their regime.  
Meanwhile, in terms of non-
refoulement practices, the Malaysian gov-
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ernment has largely ignored the principle 
since the Indochina crisis. (Robinson, 
2004). Although Malaysia initially provid-
ed refuge to those fleeing Vietnam, on hu-
manitarian grounds, the constant arrival 
of Vietnamese boat people turned away 
Malaysia’s support, authorities had towed 
more than 10,000 Vietnamese forced mi-
grants arriving Malaysian waters. Subse-
quently, in an ironic twist, the Malaysian 
Foreign Minister chaired the 1989 Inter-
national conference on Indochina in Gene-
va, which endorsed a consensus to pro-
vide temporary shelter for the displaced 
people. This inconsistent act demon-
strates what Helton describes as “the gov-
ernment’s hypocrisy” (Helton, 1992).  
In recent times, an infamous case 
related to the arrest and deportation of 
Praphan Pipithnamporn, a Thai activist 
who was involved in a peaceful anti-
monarchy group called the Organization 
for Thai Federation showed Malaysia’s 
inconsistency yet again.   Praphan fled to 
Malaysia in January 2019 to escape perse-
cution by the Thai government. Three 
months later, she was granted refugee 
status by the UNHCR. Despite her status 
as a registered asylum-seeker, the Malay-
sian government arrested her on 24 April 
2019 under the request of the Thai gov-
ernment.  She was repatriated to Thailand 
a month later and was subsequently de-
tained by the Thai police (Human Rights 
Watch, 2019a). The case has resulted in 
sharp criticisms against then ruling gov-
ernment (PH coalition) for violating the 
customary international law on the pro-
tection of refugees, the government was  
also alleged to have behaved like the old 
regime, that it replaced (Koya, 2019).  
Thailand Context 
Thailand recorded 582,130 regis-
tered forced-migrants in 2019. (UNHCR, 
2019c). Out of this number, the majority 
were stateless people, approximately 
around 80 percent, while the rest com-
prised refugees and asylum-seekers. More 
than 1.5 million unregistered stateless 
individuals were believed to live in Thai-
land (Cheva-Isarakul, 2018), and esti-
mates for registered stateless were rec-
orded at about half a million (479,943) as 
Table 1. Geographical Distribution of Registered Persons of Concern in Malaysia 





 Persons of Concern (PoC) in the Malaysian States 
Name of State Number of PoC 
Selangor 66,030 
Kuala Lumpur 27,370 
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of June 2020 (UNHCR Thailand, 2020a). 
The stateless in Thailand are usually trib-
al hill groups and non-Tai ethnics like the 
Karen in the north who are mostly with-
out Thai citizenship, as well as Burmese 
migrants who fled the country for person-
al security and a better life in Thailand.  
These groups as well as those who have 
been uprooted from their ancestral lands 
due to conflict, development and natural 
calamities fall under the category of Inter-
nally Displaced Persons (IDP). (UNHCR 
Thailand, 2020b).  
Indeed, the majority of the forced 
migrants comprise of various ethnic 
groups from Myanmar. Based on data 
provided by relief agencies such as The 
Border Consortium (TBC) and the UNHCR 
on registered and unregistered refugees 
and IDPs, the UNHCR estimated there are 
about a quarter-million IDPs in the four 
states/regions in southeast Myanmar 
where it operates (Kayin, Kayah, Mon, and 
Tanintharyi). The figure is in addition to 
the 120,000 refugees from Southeast My-
anmar living in Thailand, (who are offi-
cially, 'displaced persons', residing in 
temporary shelters) in camps close to the 
border town of Mae Sot, along the Thai-
land-Myanmar border. More than three-
quarters of these are ethnic Karen and, 
about 10% Karenni). (South & Joliffe, 
2015, p. 16, UNHCR, 2019c ). Thailand is 
also host to 6,000 urban refugees and asy-
lum-seekers from some 40 countries 
(UNHCR Thailand, 2020c). Additionally, 
there are also nine temporary shelters 
along the Thai-Myanmar border, home to 
91,940 refugees who have been there for 
almost three decades (UNHCR Thailand, 
2020b). In short, Thailand is at the center 
of numerous migratory movements in the 
region and, the country hosts an estimat-
ed two million migrants, often overlap-
ping between those arriving for economic 
reasons and asylum-seekers (Sebastien, 
2016).  
The Royal Thai Government (RTG) 
has no formal legal policy on forced mi-
grants, particularly the refugees and asy-
lum-seekers. The only legal framework 
that the country has is the 1979 Immigra-
tion Act, which does not differentiate be-
tween forced migrants and voluntary im-
migrants. It means that forced migrants 
are at risk, "subject to arrest, detention 
and deportation for failure to comply with 
its provisions" (Amnesty International, 
2017, p. 14). The RTG does not have a for-
mal government commitment to refugees 
except for those individuals displaced by 
the conflict in Myanmar and end up in 
temporary shelters along its border 
(Hedman, 2008, p. 358).  
Clearly, Southeast Asia lacks regional 
instruments for managing refugees, such 
as the 1974 African Union Convention on 
Refugees or the 1989 Cartagena Declara-
tion on Refugees. Although the ASEAN 
Human Rights Declaration enshrines the 
right to seek and receive asylum, ASEAN 
member states often show reluctance to-
wards asylum seekers and in abiding with 
non refoulment (Amnesty International, 
2017). Thailand fears that complying with 
the conventions involve financial obliga-
tions, which the country is ill-equipped to 
handle. Bangkok feels ‘threatened’ that 
such actions would increase the number 
of refugees arriving in its territory 
(Davies, 2006, p. 565; The Equal Rights 
Trust, 2014, p. 4). Attitudes towards un-
registered migrants are generally nega-
tive in urban areas, driven largely by the 
view  that unregistered migrants are eco-
nomic competitors. This view persists de-
spite most of them filling the labor gap in 
menial and 3D jobs (Sunpuwan & Niu-
mosipla, 2012: 56). 
Since January 2004, the Thai govern-
ment has revoked UNHCR’s right to 
screen individuals from Myanmar for ref-
ugee status. It has placed the Rohingya in 
a protection vacuum that excluded them 
from protection from both the UNHCR 
and the Thai Provincial Admissions Board 
(Ostrand, 2014). 
Despite the granting of refuge, politi-
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cal statements indicate that the Thai gov-
ernment viewed protecting forced mi-
grants as a detrimental imposition on the 
state. The general view is that the Thai 
government looks to the refugees for eco-
nomic and political gains rather than 
based on humanitarianism (Jetschke, 
2019). Nonetheless, the Thai government 
has vehemently rejected this view and 
alleges instead that Myanmar’s internal 
strife and misadministration has led to 
Thailand having to endure the frequent 
arrivals of displaced persons fleeing the 
military junta.  
 In 2000,  Khun Surpong Posa-
yanond, an official from the Thai Foreign 
Affairs Ministry claimed that  “the influx 
of displaced persons has entailed huge 
cost[s] for Thailand in terms of admin-
istration and personnel, environmental 
degradation, deforestation, epidemic con-
trol and the displacement of affected Thai 
villages as well as the psychological im-
pact on the local population” (H. Lang, 
2001, p. 5).  
Since 2016, the Thai government at-
tempted to soften its policy. In that year, 
the country participated in the Leaders' 
Summit on Refugees in 2016 in New York 
and committed to further progress on the 
issue. The following year, the Thai Cabinet 
issued Resolution 10/01, B.E. 2560 
(2017) on screening and management of 
forced migrants. 
Another commitment by the Thai 
government is the Memorandum of Un-
derstanding (MoU) on the Determination 
of Measures and Approaches Alternative 
to Detention of Children in Immigration 
Detention Centers, signed on 21 January 
2019 by relevant officials comprising 
Deputy Prime Minister General Prawit 
Wongsuwan, Royal Thai Police, and six 
ministries namely Education, Foreign Af-
fairs, Health, Interior, Labor, and Social 
Development and Human Security 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the King-
dom of Thailand, 2019). The MoU gener-
ally agrees to refrain from detaining chil-
dren of forced migrants, and if they have 
to be detained, it should be "as a measure 
of last resort" (Human Rights Watch, 
2019b).  
While the MoU was considered as an 
excellent initiative, human rights and ref-
ugee activists raised their concern as fur-
ther steps needed to be done. The MoU 
acknowledges that underaged forced mi-
grants should be protected; however, it 
did not address another equally im-
portant aspect, the parents. Both forced 
migrant mothers and fathers still had to 
struggle to be reunited with their chil-
dren. As for the mothers, they needed to 
pay a bail of 50,000 Thai Baht (US$1,500), 
which is somewhat burdensome. The bail 
is not applicable to the fathers; thus, the 
chance of family reunification is harder 
(Human Rights Watch, 2019b).  
On 24 December 2019, the Thai cabi-
net approved the National Screening 
Mechanism, which differentiates between 
voluntary and forced migrants. This pro-
gress was hailed positively by the UNHCR, 
regarding it as "concrete steps towards 
ensuring the protection space for refu-
gees and asylum-seekers in its territo-
ry” (UNHCR Thailand, 2019). The extent 
to which the implementation of the mech-
anism when it comes into force remains 
to be seen.  
Additionally, between 2017 and 
2019, the Thai government conducted fre-
quent crackdowns targeting overstaying 
foreigners. Since 2017, the Thai authori-
ties launched X-Ray Outlaw Foreigners 
targeting overstayed voluntary and forced 
migrants. It was one of the measures tak-
en by the Thai government to implement 
the Immigration Act. The result was that 
by 2019, almost 10 thousand people were 
under arrest (Thaiger & Nation, 2019).  
The practice was labeled discrimina-
tory as the Thai police targeted mostly 
people with African and South Asian 
backgrounds (Chen & Promyamyai, 
2018). The authorities also made refugees 
as “collateral damages” (Villadiego, 2018) 
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as hundreds of them, including children,  
who are recognized by the UNHCR, were 
also arrested. What is worse, they were 
further detained in immigration centers 
that are “notorious” (Quinley, 2019), 
“appalling” and “worse than pris-
on” (Amnesty International, 2017, p. 18). 
In short, the contradictory practice be-
tween the Thai government’s formal dip-
lomatic commitment and the reality on 
the ground, as shown above, indicates 
that forced migration governance is 
flawed and tends to persecute the victims.  
ASEAN member states are cautious 
and unwilling to provide a rule-based 
commitment in handling forced migrants. 
Member states such as Thailand, Malay-
sia, and Indonesia, however, claimed that 
despite the lack of a legally-binding com-
mitment, they would provide protection, 
albeit minimum, to refugees, including 
adherence to the non-refoulement princi-
ple on humanitarian grounds. How 
ASEAN responded to these issues relied 
heavily on the commitment of individual 
member states and shared responsibility 
to make the region a place called “home” 
for everyone (Wahab, 2017). The unre-
solved conflict in Myanmar as well as re-
cent hardships post COVID 19 indicates 
that the issue of forced migrant popula-
tion will remain a tricky and complex 
problem for ASEAN in the years to come. 
The exercise of the principle of non-
refoulement by Southeast Asian countries 
is a grey area that complicates forced mi-
gration governance.   
The Thai government, for instance, 
has been condemned for turning back 
boats carrying refugees or deporting 
them at the request of their respective 
governments. Despite the country com-
mitting, since 2017, to protecting forced 
migrants, the situation has remained sta-
tus quo. Some of the cases that received 
global attention are discussed below.  
On the 11th and 6th January 2018, 
the Thai court convicted two forced mi-
grants, A Ga and Sam Sokha, for overstay-
ing in the country and, violating the Immi-
gration Act. The former is a Vietnamese 
man, while the latter is a Cambodian 
woman. Although both were recognized 
as refugees by the UNHCR, they were 
fined and jailed (Amnesty International, 
2018). It underscores the dismissiveness 
of the Thai government on the rights of 
refugees, leading many to criticize Thai-
land for violation of human rights. A Ga’s 
fate was better as he and his family were 
later resettled in the USA (Duy & Anh, 
2019). Sam Sokha, on the other hand, was 
less fortunate. Despite similar efforts 
from the UNHCR and western embassies 
to resettle her in a third country, the Thai 
government handed her to the Cambodi-
an authorities on 8 February 2018, lead-
ing to her immediate imprisonment there 
(Al Jazeera, 2018).  
Another example was Hakeem Al-
Araibi, a footballer who fled his country 
Bahrain and received asylum in Australia. 
In November 2018, he traveled to Thai-
land with his wife for a holiday. On his 
way back to Australia, he was stopped at 
the Bangkok airport and then jailed by the 
Thai government at the request of Bah-
rain. His imprisonment sparked contro-
versy and drew international attention, 
particularly from the human rights 
groups and the Australian government 
(Davidson, 2018). He was finally released 
in February 2019 and was granted Aus-
tralian citizenship a month later 
(Henriques-Gomes, 2019).  
Subsequently, a similar case emerged in 
January 2019 relating to Rahaf Moham-
med al-Qunun, a Saudi girl aged 18. She 
renounced Islam and feared that she 
would be killed by her family; hence she 
made her way to Australia seeking asy-
lum. While transiting at Bangkok airport, 
the Thai immigration officials wanted to 
deport her. She barricaded herself in a 
hotel room and sought support from so-
cial media. Her case triggered the inter-
vention of the UNHCR, after initial re-
sistance from the Thai government 
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(Regan & Britton, 2019). She was eventu-
ally released and obtained Canadian citi-
zenship.  In short, all of these cases, either 
refoulement or intention to practice re-
foulement, demonstrated the lack of polit-
ical will on the part of the Thai govern-
ment in mitigating the problems and gov-
ernance of forced migration. 
CONCLUSION 
Our findings indicate that the gov-
ernance of forced migration in Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and Thailand, to some extent, 
reflect a common Asian expression; ‘same 
same but different’, where there are 
“contradictions, differences, and varia-
tions within an understanding of the simi-
larities which link and unite” (Fong, Win-
ter, Rii, Khanjanusthiti, & Tandon, 2012). 
As those countries have not ratified the 
1951 Convention, their legal framework 
related to forced migration is considera-
bly weak.  Lately, these nations have 
demonstrated their efforts to improve 
forced migration governance by develop-
ing a few policies. Indonesia arguably has 
performed better with the Perpres 
125/2016 Law. For Malaysia, forced mi-
grants continue to provide fodder for po-
litical rhetoric. This is noted from the 
short lived Malaysia Baharu government’s 
inability to fulfill their political commit-
ment in relation to forced migrants 
(Points Number 35 and 59, of their PH 
Political Manifesto) to recent events of 
turning away boatload of Rohingya refu-
gees arriving at the height of the COVID 
19 pandemic. In the case of Thailand, the 
state follows in the footsteps of Indonesia 
in moving forward, albeit small steps in 
the last few years. However, we find that 
there have been inconsistencies between 
political will (policies) and political action 
(mistreatment of forced migrants).   
In regards to the second criteria, 
that of the non-refoulement principle, 
there are notable variances practiced 
among the countries. The Indonesian ex-
perience in the practice of non-
refoulement can be traced back to 1956 
with the Circular Letter of the Prime Min-
ister No. 11/R.I./1956 on Political Refu-
gees. The latest Perpres 125/2016 further 
ensures the government's commitment to 
comply with the non-refoulement princi-
ple. Malaysia and Thailand, in contrast, 
have expelled some forced migrants back 
to their own countries. Both countries 
faced fierce criticisms for their controver-
sial, at times, inhumane acts through the 
detention and refoulement of vulnerable 
people, despite the latter receiving recog-
nition by the UNHCR.  
What can be done better? In order to 
be more effective in forced migration gov-
ernance, states need to shift towards 
adopting needs-based policies. Although 
Indonesia is possibly one step ahead of 
Malaysia and Thailand, much more needs 
to be done. It is still premature to expect 
these nations to ratify the 1951 Conven-
tion. Nonetheless, there are some possible 
ways, such as to have long-term vision 
policies, strengthening regional partner-
ships (through ASEAN and beyond), and 
enhancing engagement of non-state ac-
tors.  
Forced migration remains a side-
lined issue, it is not a priority compared 
to national issues. In fact during the 
COVID 19 period, throughout the first 
quarter of 2020, forced migrants were 
seen as a threat to local population, in 
terms of jobs being snatched away from 
the local people and as vulnerable groups 
who were potentially “super spreaders” 
of the COVID strain.   Forced migrants 
were also subjected to racial biases, prej-
udice and all forms of discrimination.  
The potential for forced migrants to 
be permissibly employed and contribute 
to the job market can be positively ex-
plored rather than the blanket denial of 
employment for this people. This may 
turn out to be a win-win situation for both 
the host and the migrant groups in rela-
tion to income and economic develop-
ment, while also protecting the persecut-
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ed and vulnerable groups from neigh-
bouring countries. A regional approach 
that takes into consideration humanitari-
anism, despite the challenge of narrow 
opportunities and slow progress for 
forced migrants’ resettlement in a third 
country, can be positively developed.   
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